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Abstract   
In explaining the reasons for sustained existence of 
tolerance in Indian philosophical mind and continuation 
of tolerant practices in socio-political life, Amartya Sen 
argues that tolerance is inherently a social enterprise, 
which may appear as contingent, but for all intents and 
purposes is persistent. Basing his thesis that is opposed to 
Cartesian dualism, which makes a distinction between 
mind and body, Sen submits that Indian system of 
universalizing perception finds a subtle form of 
connection between mind and body. He expands the 
ancient core worldview, Vasundhara kutumbakam (entire 
world as one family) as a secular tolerant civil 
code,1which makes a connection between the 
transcendental and the pragmatic planes of 
consciousness, and reconstructs a thesis about tolerance 
around human consciousness, which is collectivized and 
anchored in an acknowledged public space in society that 
is joined together psychologically as well as 
philosophically. Tolerance as consciousness can be 
regarded a necessary condition for playing the role of 
intentionality as stipulated by classical philosophy 
(Advaita Vedanta; buddhi, or intelligence as in Samkhya 
and Yoga). Aware of this ancient wisdom that accepts 
relativism as an impasse over some evaluative matter, Sen 
avoids the pitfalls of cultural relativism in tolerance by 
offering an argument that is based on the metaphysics of 
Advaita Vedanta and other religious and secular 
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literature, and epitomizes an internationalizing virtue in 
tolerant traditions. I would examine some interconnected 
issues, such as the ethical “perimeter” of Sen’s 
philosophical observation of totalized value system and 
Indian tolerant attitudes in real life, etc., raising the 
broader question about the location of cultural identity in 
relation to supranational state organization. My chief 
argument is that Sen has been able to observe a 
connection between the Advaita Vedantic moral 
philosophy that informs that viewed from the Brahmanic 
perspective of absolute knowledge in unity, the apparent 
subject of duality is not the ultimate subject. My 
conclusion is that valuing of tolerance, individual liberty 
as well as civil rights is a particular contribution of 
Western thinking and philosophy; the Western advocates 
of these rights often provide ammunition to the non-
Western critics of tolerance and human rights. 
Tolerance and the Dualism Debate in Indian Literature 
The use of tolerance/toleration in its current form as diversity and 
openness to the life choices of others was presented by John Stuart 
Mill (On Liberty, 1859). Following this tradition, the value of 
tolerance as coexistence of faiths was developed within European 
religious debates that were at first completely separate from the 
elaboration of “rights.” On the other hand, characterizing Indian 
tolerance as “inclusiveness,” Paul Hacker (1913-1979) makes a 
distinction between “practical tolerance” and “doctrinal tolerance” 
to define rationality, knowledge, and philosophy, and recognizes 
the existence of tolerant attitude that has been common in Indian 
comprehensible expression of transcultural human ability, 
corresponding to reality.2 In this sense, Indian thought process in 
tolerance remains suspicious of the isolated self, because “I-maker” 
(ashamkara) is believed to be the source of all human conflicts. The 
problem of consciousness comes down to the problem of how to 
give an objective third person account of what is essentially a 
subjective, first person phenomenon. Thus, the noted Indian 
neuroscientist V.S. Ramachandran recommends that there is a need 
“to reconcile the first person and third person accounts of the 
universe” as the “single most important problem in science” as 
well.3 Today, the problem of conscious perception marks the very 
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limit of human striving for tolerant understanding that discusses, 
among others, the usefulness of the non-dual perception of self. 
The Advaita Vedanta philosophy contends that with certain 
identifying marks (laksanas), the self may be distinguished from 
everything else that is not self. In this way, it adds, the referent 
(sakya) of the word “self” or “I” becomes mixed. In this instance, 
perception becomes our intentionality, subjectivity, sustained self-
consciousness, and our ability to form intentions, whereas in 
indeterminate perception, a qualifier is directly recognized, and 
thus, an epistemological regress concerning qualification is 
blocked. Indeterminate perception as awareness gives rise to 
determinate awareness through a natural process that has nothing 
to do with human desires, acts, or intentions. The relation between 
the two is not merely psychological, as the Dharmakiriti insists, 
confusing many Naiyayaikas of the earlier School, who submit that 
with justificatory grounds as casual instruments (pramanas), we can 
have “cognition”4 of the objects of the knowledge (prameyas).5 
Advaita-Vedanta insists that in the reflective stage, the mind 
integrates the mental contents corresponding to the object with 
recognized precepts. Tolerance here forms part of his “capability” 
and assessment of “what a person can do in line with his or her 
conception of the good.”6 
Awareness of plural truth and possibly a measure of existential 
perplexity constitute the seed which grows into tolerance, provided 
tolerance is “watered by inner freedom and nourished by truth as 
subjectivity and culture as historical contingency. Apathy is not 
any index of tolerance, but only unconcern for others. (Jamal 
Khawaja, Madras, 2007).  Amartya Sen frames the ethical rules in 
Indian tolerance in general terms arguing that the concept of 
universal tolerance in the broad sense of norms of every human 
being is not a relatively new idea, but insists that the means to this 
knowledge has been different. In the West, dualism as divisive 
perception relates to the concepts of Kant, Hume, Berkeley, and 
Locke, to Descartes and beyond, but to Indian philosophical 
discourse it is more elaborative, because interactionism may not 
embrace a Hume-like account of causation.Thus, Sen argues that 
the “so-called Western values of freedom and liberty,” sometimes 
viewed as an ancient Western inheritance, “are not particularly 
ancient, nor exclusively Western in their inheritance.”7 This 
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conclusion depends on accurate analyses. The mainstream Advaita 
School, for all its doctrinal commitment to defending a-conceptual 
reality, developed its own complex logical formalism as early as the 
1000s. This so-called mahavidya mode of syllogistic reasoning even 
influenced the practice of dialecticians such as Shri Harsha, and 
became an object of debate in the Nyaya School before it elaborated 
its own roundabout methods in the form of Neo-Nyaya. 
Eventually, Neo Nyaya became like the European logical 
positivism of the early 1900s in its concern for extreme formalism.8 
What is interesting is that this philosophical argumentation could 
not give up the overreaching bhakti-religion’s emotionalism that 
generated a new scholastic school to practice the value of universal 
acceptance of many values. Tolerance became ingrained both in 
concept and logic. Tolerance in India is an intrinsic value like love, 
whereas appeasement is a strategy for avoiding conflict and 
achieving success. 
The two broad, traditional and competing theories of mind are 
dualism and materialism (physicalism). The former holds that the 
conscious mind, or a conscious mental state is non-physical in some 
sense, whereas the second one holds that the mind is the brain, or is 
caused by neural activity. In this context, many answers are 
framed. Dualism faces the problem of explaining how a non-
physical substance or mental state can causally interact with the 
physical body. Unlike Cartesian dualism which involves a 
distinction between mind and body, mind in Samkhya philosophy, 
as in many other systems of Indian thought, has remained a subtle 
form of matter. Like others, the classical Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of 
mind and self also provides judgment that juxtaposes Western 
physicalist dualism and psychophysical dualism.Thus, the 
juxtaposition of at least two individuals, the dependence of one on 
the other, is the condition of possibility of all speech. Every time I 
take to speech, what I say depends on the other toward whom my 
language is directed: indifferent, adversary, or friendly, or ally. 
Meaning in any juxtaposition is always the fruit of collaboration, 
not conflict.9 Tolerance, combining mind and body in India, Sen 
posits, is inescapably plural in concept and hence in evaluation 
(Sen’s parameterization). Sen’s account, drawing our attention to 
the internal pluralism of the concept and practice, he then refracts 
the interpretation on our measurement through his economic and 
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philosophical account. His source is mostly ancient texts and logic. 
The Nyaya inter-actionists do not have Descartes’s interaction 
problem because they embrace a “Hume-like” account of causation. 
Hume introduces the causative factor in inter-action-ism. We know 
well that our knowledge and action are related. We expect mental 
states to occur significantly in causal explanations of actions, 
because otherwise postulating mind looks like redundant. But 
Hume assumes that attributes of knowledge in causal explanations 
of our action can be replaced without explanatory loss by 
corresponding elements of belief. This causal connection has 
another implication in explaining unification of diverse elements, 
despite apparent contradictions. Tolerance implies active 
participation and active participation in social interactions. Sen 
argues that if we express our tolerance as a subjective perception 
with our own situation or even personal preference then we ignore 
many variables that remain divisible. He recognizes that “the value 
of toleration” or the importance of individual freedom have been 
preached all along in literature, but it has remained relevant only 
“for the selected few,” because in the caste system and women’s 
position in a family and social abuses, the idea of tolerance has 
remained dormant, mostly for political reasons. 
Tolerance and Realism in India 
Realism in tolerant acceptance of various national and international 
cultural values is vividly projected in Raj Kapoor’s movie song, 
“Mera Jhootha hai Japani…,” etc., reporting that Indian slippers are 
Japanese and hats are Russian, but “my heart is Indian.” Partha 
Chatterjee interprets this interaction as utilization of the 
inner/outer divide, whereas for Homi Bhabha, this is an acceptance 
of others’ norms and practices as acceptance of a hybrid norm. R. 
Radhakrishnan, of the University of Massachusetts, writes, “One 
just lives it as the Real, i.e., a Real that has imploded into self in 
total flight from historical forms of representation.” This 
assessment, for Sen, is an acceptance of tolerant well-being based 
on his “functioning approach.” Our knowing is a state of mind, and 
a state of mind is a mental state of a subject. Paradigmatic mental 
attitudes include love and hatred, and even pain. Our attitudes are 
propositions, believing that something is so.  In short, knowing is 
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merely state of mind but actual knowing is not, because it is factive; 
truth as realism is a non-mental component of knowing. Thus, 
Gayatri Chakarvarty argues that “there is no more representation; 
there is nothing but action,” which is a theory and action of practice 
which relate to each other as relays and form social networks.10 
Sen cites ancient text and logic to argue that tolerance needs to be 
evaluated in the form of realism.  The realism question comes in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, especially in Varanasi, as 
interest in Raghunath’s reappraisal of ancient Vaisakha 
metaphysics. Raghunath’s new realism as “new” awareness 
consists in the first instance as the rejection of a variety of 
reductionist hypotheses. Later, early modern thinkers demonstrate 
that a reductions is compatible with realism, a type of realism 
called “sophisticate realism.” Among the Indians, the Vaisesikas 
are usually considered to be most robust advocates of an “across-
the-board realism.” They admit, among many, a single real 
connecting relation to bind the objects (dravya) to their qualities, 
motions, “universal features,” and distinguishes (samavaya). Each 
self is thought to have an accompanying but distinct mind (manas), 
responsible for performing a range of subconscious executive 
functions, including the regulation of respiration and relay the 
signals between the body and the self (consciousness). In this 
instance, both political intolerance and social discrimination in 
patriarchal interest in social conflicts have gone against the lessons 
of the accepted texts of the earlier times. The solution can be found 
in a compromise.  
The Advaita Vedanta’s position accepts a compromise position. 
There are external objects out there. When consciousness objectifies 
an object, a mental state called antahkarnavrti, assumes the form of 
that object, and this state is manifested by the self-shinning 
witness-consciousness. We observe the substance drop as well 
words, consciousness is only self-shinning and is not intentional. 
According to Advaitva Vedanta, consciousness is intrinsically non-
intentional and formless, and intentionality and form are 
superimposed on it. As against this, Nyaya Vaiseskia suggests that 
consciousness is formless, but intrinsically intentional. According 
to the Jogacara Buddhists, consciousness is intentional in the sense 
that the act-content distinction is internal to it. Other Buddhists 
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such as Sautrantikas, accept the internal act-content distinction, but 
also admit an external object.11 Not unlike Hume, the Buddhist 
philosophy does not find an abiding enduring self within, and so 
resolves the putative self into an aggregate of the five aggregates, 
skandhas: sensation, feelings, conceptions, traces and awareness. 
Each of these events is self-cognizing. On the other hand, then, cit 
means not an event-present abiding principle but the instantaneous 
event of consciousness, self-shining.12 Thus, J. N Mahanty argues 
that formal-mathematical rationality, devoid of consciousness, 
provides the anthropological, local, and cultural rationality which 
sustains relativisms of all sorts and which resists attempts to 
impose universality ab extra.13 For Sen, this stance seeks 
hybridization of tolerant values, reflected in Vaishnavism of 
Tulsidas, presenting tolerant consciousness as an all-encompassing 
“ocean of doctrines and traditions,” which are expanded to neo-
Hindu usage in the works of Swami Vivekananda.14 
Sen, a product of Enlightenment’s rationalism, breaks convention 
by drawing on resources from the principle of inference, such as 
Bhagavad-Gita and the moral dilemma of warrior Arjun as an 
integral part of his moral argument. This position assumes two 
interconnected dimensions, as Sen affiliates with bhakti radical 
religion and Sufi Islam with the idea of “universal brotherhood” 
conforming to the metaphysics of Upanishads and Vedanta, and 
leading to the epistemology of Nyaya, even to the materialist 
Lokayaya/Carvaka materialism.15 For Sen, this consciousness, being 
an act of self-fulfillment, becomes a supplemental achievement 
whereas there may be a wider capacity to acknowledge what can 
cope with inner conflicts, such as us and them, culminating in the 
integrating system. A conscientious-conformist passes through the 
transitional stage to be a model for general acceptance, as 
consciousness which is both private and public self-consciousness, 
incorporating a measure of social anxiety that has no relevance to 
relativity.16 In this way, Sen conforms to the universal aspect of 
Neo-Vedantic consciousness of Vivekananda, Gandhi and Tagore 
and derives faith from the classical realist tradition of “all-inclusive 
tolerance,” showing religious plurality in the form of Rigvedic ekam 
and vipra sthanabheda.17  Madhusudana Saraswati explicitly argues 
that the tradition of characterizing foreign “barbarians” (melatcha) 
has no “soteriological relevance whatsoever.” In fact, the melachas 
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are believed to be people coming from unknown “black water” 
(kala pani) that stretched up to Ceylon. Interpreting tolerant attitude 
of Neo-Hinduism, S. Radhakrishnan argues that the extension and 
universalization of the tradition of tolerance act as a simple and 
unproblematic adjustment to the wider context respecting our 
“perception.”18 As Jerry Foror argues, identity of causal powers has 
to be assessed across contexts, not within contexts, thereby raising 
the question of pluralistic means to social solution.”19 Contextual 
analysis is best done by translating the “analysandum into 
expressions,” which are clearer or easier to use.20 Ken Wilbur, a 
leading thinker in Eastern thought, traces the source of conceptual 
language to evaluate ideas drawn from the East to help in the 
development of a comprehensive model of consciousness.21 The 
idea of the expansion of consciousness points to the whole field of 
mental health and of growth that deals with the problems of 
alienation. Sen’s study of the literature demonstrates that eminent 
Western philosophers such as Plato, St. Augustine, and others 
sought “preference for order and discipline over freedom,” like 
Confucius’ priorities for public order, typically ignored the value of 
freedom and tolerance and eventually human mind.22 For Sen, the 
concept of tolerance is a uniting idea coordinating in between-ness.   
Relativism in any tolerance debate survives on extreme contrasts. 
Ken Wilbur argues that in relativism thinking progresses in 
hierarchical stages, each stage being higher than the preceding 
stage.23 Piaget calls this cognitive stages of development. Each stage 
contains an emotional stage.24 The existentialist can remedy the ego 
self by asking for more tolerance to get rid of anxiety, and looks for 
transpersonal solution.25 In contrast, a synthesis of concepts is 
sought by Hindu self, having two levels: Jiva or individual soul, 
and Atman, its universal and spiritual aspect, the experience of 
which is found in Eastern Enlightenment. Troy Wilson argues that 
what is needed is not a world of one philosophy, but a world that 
appreciates diversity, a worldview in which there is a willingness 
to respect and in some instances to assimilate ways of thinking and 
acting of other peoples.26  Thus, Indian and Western philosophies 
may provide analyses of perspectives for worldviews about 
tolerant views affording a transcendent states. Philosophy provides 
multi-stage principles designed to access states of consciousness 
and their corresponding worldviews, which are different but not 
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relativistic.  However, Sen recognizes the limitations of the 
narrative of internal debates about a moral value, and adds that 
“cross-cultural linkages (in a moral debate) have more importance 
in several ways.27 This raises the question of the duality of social 
and personal being. Strawson argues that the concepts of pure 
individual consciousness does not exist, suggesting that morality 
does not belong to a particular individual or group. Bandura also 
argues that certain traits are not a native development but is 
acquired in social contexts. In sum, pluralism speaks of contextual 
solutions.28 
Sen expresses disapproval of Indian intolerance in tradition-bound 
caste intolerance, and oppressive treatment of women and girls, 
reflected in the advocacy of “Asian Values Debate,” and the 
Western mode of intolerance toward the stagnant “Asian mode of 
production,” all highlighting group intolerance. Even if we assume 
that the earlier European study of Indian culture has mostly been a 
knowledge-gathering mission, it is difficult to accept ethics of the 
arguments. Sen argues that the West has been ignorant of facts that 
the Mughal rulers in India, with one exception, Aurangzeb, were 
not only extremely tolerant, but also could theorize about the need 
for tolerant diversity, and indeed, Akbar’s declarations in the 
sixteenth century on tolerance “can count among the classics” of 
political toleration in any part of the world, Sen claims. “The non-
comparative motto was to tolerate and protect all religious 
groups.” Asoka’s propagation of universal toleration, although 
partly due to his strategy for political legitimacy in uncertain times, 
was for the propagation of tolerant ethical private life.29  Martha 
Nussbaum and Sen argue that human beings as “social creatures” 
want to “share with others a conception of value,” which is may be 
rephrased by the Upanishadic lesson that posits that “there must be 
a link between the energy of human beings and that of the 
universe.”  This simplified message suggests that competition 
between two sets of ethical relativism amounts to a particular 
complex, which is “both psychologically disastrous and 
philosophically unjustifiable.”30 Both Western and Asian ethical 
relativists begin with the apparent insight that the real world can 
only be described from different points of view. The initial picture 
is that there is a real world (economic growth in Asia), but their 
representation of cultural values is always going to be relative to a 
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point of view, because all representation is from some point of view 
or other, and this is supposed to give someone a relativism of 
reality but not of truth.  This gives a relational version of truth but 
it is not a version of relativism about truth. Moral theories can be 
classified into deontology and teleology and so, we can argue that 
that the distinction is vitally relevant in our understanding of the 
nature of ethical theories.31 Thus, Sen’s call is for liberation from 
anthropological relativism.  
Relativism and Cross-Purposes 
Sen argues that cultural relativism becomes so entrenched that 
even the unhealthiest social practicing norms, such as female 
genital excision, foot binding, human sacrifice, and agricultural 
taboos attended by chronic hunger, and sati widow burning are 
being rationalized. Some paradigmatically belief systems claiming 
that Indians, despite the working vibrant democratic constitution, 
are culturally incapable of going above the fixed caste-infested 
social formulations and class differences. This is based on the 
assumption that the economically powerful elite class has the 
dialectical dynamics of the karma-samsara-doctrine that have their 
own conclusion: first,   all dalits are souls, second, souls are masters 
of their fortune, and last, the dalits themselves can change their 
conditions. The medieval Bhakti religion added to this “ideological 
drawback.”32 In short, cultural relativists argue that some human 
groups being defined by their nationality, language, cultural 
ancestry, or belief system, are incapable of certain universally 
accepted norms. For Sen, the assumption of internal conflict of 
values does at once raise the question of identification. As Kuhn 
(1962) emphasizes sociological factors leading to the rise and fall of 
scientific models, and then Rorty (980) defends the impossibility of 
finding universal ideals on which to ground science, it follows that 
the concept of finding a regular pattern that makes sense of history 
seems trivial, a consequence drawn by Lyotard’s (1979) declaration 
of the end of the meta-narrative, all expressed in the form of 
uncertainty in postmodernism, eventually failing to identify the 
value in any cross-purposes. A neutral philosophical space does 
not accommodate the self-immolating suttee-widow practices. 
During the 1990s in the northern state of Rajasthan, suttee (widow 
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burning) was still contained within the interested use of cultural 
relativism. Suttee could not be read with Christian female 
martyrdom, with the defunct husband standing in the form of 
transcendental One; or with war, with the husband standing in for 
sovereign or state, for the sake of a debased ideology of “self-
sacrifice” that can be mobilized. The human agency here always be 
the woman, and the male as protector of morals. If Gayatri Spivak’s 
“Can the Subaltern Speak?” then how to explain the pious deed by 
women’s sacrifice? For the upper class, this “trace-structure” is the 
consequence of the emotional political activism, being “moral 
love,” in the words of B.K. Matilal. That the models in suttee are not 
realistic is obvious. Nevertheless, they enable us to see how 
sensitivity works, and the startling demands it can impose. The 
remedy for this pathology is not to relativize sensitivity. That is 
why there is no direct bridge from action (e, g, widow-burning) to 
moral at all. Frankfurt argues that morality will show up in the due 
course of time as conditions will change.For Kant, the connection 
between action and morality exist and rational will follow the 
moral law. In Kant’s version the will itself is a kind of causality 
with a clear causing condition. 
Looking back to the concerns that has provoked our discussion, it is 
useful to interpret rationality in Kantian way. When we derive 
action from the fixed principle, we fail to be moved by a reason, 
which is a deliberate error. It is not a lack of subjective connection 
to the reason’s value. Action requires no separate motive, Kant 
argues. But on Frankfurter’s view, in reason one has ultimately to 
depend on what one values. Both these Western arguments leave 
us uneasy, because, first, this tells that volitional judgment is 
sufficient ground for action, second, a free cause arises from a 
practical point of view.33 Both Indian philosopher Nagarjuna and 
the Greek thinker Sextus see dependent concepts of pairs such as 
action and result, left and right, are meaningful as they do not 
recognize the relational existence. Such concepts are like two sticks 
leaning against one another; if we take one out then the other will 
fall. It means that action as a cause has a connection result; more 
importantly, the argument is that both cause and result are unite 
into one.34 In other words, it is pointless to argue that our action 
can stand alone with any fear of results. So, “justification” of an 
action like suttee burning must stand to scrutiny initially, not at the 
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end. As a way of gaining some perspective on the part played by 
the active-passive contrast, and its relation to the contrast between 
internality and externality, it is helpful to compare this pair of 
contrasts with a certain traditional picture of the distinction 
between and intentional states such as beliefs and desires, which 
are our attitudes. Kant refers to this attitude, which needs an 
identification. Thomas Nagel makes a distinction between 
motivated and unmotivated desires. He argues that there is more 
than one way to justification. At least, he must take his “other” 
attitudes as having some voice in determining the course of the 
desire or attitude. This is the essence in identification of a value.  
Although the concept of being relativist in tolerance is 
anthropocentric and relational, the concept may well be descriptive 
of an intrinsic feature of relativism, a feature that is constituted by 
the surface texture. An ethnocentric and relational idea can be used 
in the justification of the fundamental responses constitutive of the 
idea. As we describe special feature of relativism about national 
identity, we simply use the notion as counting features of 
relativism. Reports of subjective experiences on the basis of 
introspection do not seem to produce consistent findings. Even the 
most widely accepted, Noam Chomsky’s famous “language 
acquisition device,” the inspiration for modular thinking, remains a 
mere construct.35 The purpose of classical Indian thought 
experiments are to make moral assumptions, intuitions, and 
principles so that they can be disputed or defended. Moral 
philosophy is a normative activity which is to say, one establishes, 
investigates or criticizes norms – which is quite different from a 
descriptive account, as in relativism, of mental states. Since the time 
of Socrates, moral philosophy has tried to clarify beliefs and has 
challenged the conceptual framework within which they have been 
generated. It is time for philosophy to reassume its basic duty to 
look critically at the conceptual framework and presuppositions 
within which consciousness operates. When we speak of 
“consciousness,” we by necessity address something that is about 
inter-subjective relationships. Then the question arises as to 
whether the status of being “objective” is completely independent 
of subjectivity.36 The question facing W. V. Quine(1960) is whether 
inter-subjectivity is definable without presupposing an objective 
environment in which communication takes place, for it can be an 
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instant wiring from Subject A to Subject B, in which the subject-
object dichotomy is denied.37 
As conscious creatures, human beings have a stream of conscious 
thoughts and experiences, which deny the ingredients of 
relativism, and establish the relevance of tolerant attitude, if not 
habit. Our conscious stream is not continuous as it is interrupted by 
deep sleep and other periods of unconsciousness, but it is united by 
a degree of constancy in its elements, by the hidden content of 
these elements, and by its supposed causal basis.38 As a rational 
creature, we can make judgments about reasons and hence of 
having judgment-sensitive attitudes such as belief and intention.39 
The exercise of a capacity for reflection, the acquisition of conscious 
beliefs and the capacity to employ them flexibly can produce 
higher order desires and volitions. Its normative parameters have 
no special rational or metaphysical authority; they arise from 
material circumstances.  Some basic senses including consciousness 
provide reasons for action as is agent-neutral (Nagel’s “what it is 
like”) that may well investigate the Rawslian primary goods 
(liberty, wealth) or Sen’s basic capabilities, having agency power. 
Sen insists that consciousness is self-transparency of experience and 
so, it is an act of self-referring in which an individual presents to 
oneself. Generally, Western psychologies take for granted the idea 
that our usual egoistic sense of conscious identity is natural, and as 
such, appropriate. 
In contrast, Indian psychological/philosophical conscience views 
the ego as absent in self-consciousness. The sense of a continuous 
solid ego, as in Buddhist insight mediation, dissolves on close 
scrutiny into insubstantiality. For the Buddhist and Hindu 
philosophies, there is no “ghost in the machine,” and thus, 
philosophies and psychologies, which are based on assumptions of 
ego identity, are viewed as based on absence of consciousness that 
succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity and as such, are 
in perpetual flux.”40 Attempts to reach a consensus-based synthesis 
of human consciousness have been made from different 
perspectives.  Matilal argues that when we talk about relative value 
of consciousness, our chief concern has to be with ethics. For him, 
ethical realism is ill-defined, because it is mostly about cognitive 
realism. It is Hamlet’s dilemma in which neither is good or bad, but 
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thinking makes it so. Sen prescribes inter-subjectivity to promote 
the endless rewarding and diversification of consciousness rather 
than homogenization or Bhabha’s constantly moving hybridized 
identity with locational fluidity.  Merleau-Ponty’s consciousness’s 
eventual mode of being does not openly manifest itself, but 
remains a consciousness-as-witness.”41 His contribution is that 
subjectivity is primarily of the body, but in contrast, Hume argues 
that conscience may exist separately and has no need of anything to 
support its existence.42 
Sen argues that the identification of our tolerant values and 
conscious position in observation depends on our methods of 
calculation from different angles. He gives an example: The sun 
and the moon look similar “in size,” but our observation is not 
beyond “positional independence,” arguing that a legitimate 
requirement needs to be compatible with variations of what is seen 
from “different positions,”43 which report that consciousness as the 
entire phenomenological being of the spiritual ego. However, 
consciousness being the phenomenological ego, as “bundling” or 
interweaving of psychic experiences,44 conforms to the traditional 
tolerant attitudes in perception, beliefs, and thus, verbalizes the 
indications of those experiences, although many of them are not 
named. Conceptive perception of ethics means an ability to form 
ideas by attending to perception’s phenomenological angle. If 
something is known to be a mango, without any further 
consideration it can be known to be a fruit. Our knowledge can be 
propositional and heuristic, and diagnostic, Sen argues. 
Positional Observation: Rules of Engagements   
Sen defines Indian tolerance in the wider frame of ancient 
philosophy that is connected to the world of experience that is not 
crystalized in the orthodoxy of Hindu “darsahnas.” Early Nyaya 
consisted in classifying modes of knowledge, including a 
description of the bodily senses, and of the components of a debate. 
The Samkhya dualism consisted of prakriti and purusha, the two 
world substances roughly corresponding to matter and spirit, and 
vaguely reminiscent of the mythology of world production from 
the union of god and goddess. It is in this mode of unity between 
apparently different entities that Sen constructs the idea of 
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tolerance. He assumes that the subset of a position of each 
individual stance acts according to the degree of achievement of a 
given attainment to one of the indicators, which is considered for 
the functioning assessment. Here, association values equality to one 
identity, a condition for full achievement with respect to a given 
functioning. The choice of association depends on the application 
of the context as well as an   indicator. The power of a theory, in 
Kuhn’s words, “discloses new phenomena or previously unnoted 
relationships.”45 When we build up statements from their parts by 
observation, we gain new subject matters for the resulting 
statement to be partly about, but we never lose old ones.46 
Parameter in this sense goes beyond the “bundle theory,” which is 
merely “reflexive reductionism.” It is relevant to know that the 
Greek word “para” means “beside,” implying that secondary 
themes are also to be measured for a comprehensive view of an 
observation.  
In this sense, parameterization, Sen adds, of observation of some 
key aspects of tolerance requires generative solutions that appeal to 
the syntactic theory, examining the difference between inner 
mental structure and the surface structure, presumably reaching an 
objective status and attaining a “mean” position. In Indian logic, it 
is not merely a matter of logical ability because its centrality and 
commonality stand for unity of our perceptive vision. Although 
Rorty observes “mean” as a “mean or intermediate disposition 
regarding emotions and actions, not that it is a disposition towards 
the mean or intermediate emotions and actions,”47 in India, sincere 
“mean” implies a model of perceptive thinking that harmonizes the 
“opposite extremes.”48 The Indian logical “mean” suggests that a 
single encounter does not resolve everything because  there will be 
other matches besides competition between deduction and 
induction, other playing seasons, other Olympic, where keen 
rivalry will continue for further grace and glory.49 This expanded 
parametric strategy continues to this day, although it is less evident 
how to handle typological generalizations within the minimalist 
program.  
During the 1920s, the word “parameter” derived from “para” 
yielded a sense of measurable factor, which now helps define a 
particular system of observation. Some sincere statements are 
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entirely about “observation,” but meaningful statements need not 
be entirely about perceptive observation because observation 
allows us to produce a long chain of inferences leading to 
knowledge. In the West, H.P. Grice’s maxim of sincerity requires 
someone who asserts p and not to believe –p, not, as might be 
expected, to believe p. But if one asserts p while agnostic about p, 
one is insincere in a way that seems to flout conversational 
regulations. Conversely, knowing p while unable to rid myself of 
what I recognize as an irrational belief in –p, I might reasonably 
assert p, contrary to Grice’s maxim but not the more obvious 
sincerity condition.  Grice’s two specific maxims of quality, “Do not 
say what you believe to be false,” and “Do not say that for which 
you lack adequate evidence.”50 This is the ultimate scope of 
parameterization in which the substitution of “knew” for “did not 
know” in a statement yields a contradiction. For any reasonable 
notion of warrant, a true assertion based only on a “lucky guess” 
will satisfy the truth rule without satisfying the warrant rule. In 
other words, Grice’s maxim says, “Do not make your contribution 
more informative than is required.”51 This stance brings us to the 
idea of relationship between the central position and the 
decentered one. 
What is the difference between the center and the decentered? 
Decentered perspectives in pluralism may not be an example of a 
pluralistic ideal that may unduly suggest that “every   ideal of 
human flourishing is as good as every other’s.”52 Pluralism does 
not lead to paralysis of responsibility, nor tolerance stands for 
“neither-nor,” or the Buddhist neutral normative “The Middle 
Way.” For B.K Matilal, this is “realism without dogma,”53 realism 
that lies in the idea of “overlapping” and “emergence” of identity, 
rather than its “imposition through metaphysical essentialism in 
which “rationality” may prevail in positional observation of 
tolerance. From a practical point of view, recognizing the global 
nature of human migration that is intrinsic to the shifting away 
from direct confrontation with the nation-state and at the same 
time creates new social and political areas, Sen invokes Martin 
Albrow’s “performative citizenship,” which represents potent 
alternative foci for a tolerant collective action.54 Pacifist in nature, 
this tolerant stance toward the older structure, becomes a new 
social configuration, which is still basically responsive, and indeed, 
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reactive to the world which it has not made. The new center takes 
the positions of all decentered positions, not by assimilation but by 
integration. In this case, intolerance should no more be regarded as 
central to tolerance, because intolerance does not demonstrate any 
direct connection with the theory of relativism, which as Putnam 
observes, is defined by the local cultural norms that are “merely the 
demonic counterpart of positivism.”55 Relative prejudice functions 
as the intellectuals’ internalized world-view and ethical norm, 
which may only satisfy the holder’s intellectual, emotional, and 
social consciousness. Halbfass argues that the emerging concept of 
tolerance/toleration in India has been flexible enough “to be 
applied to the technological world,” and the issues of 
“international understanding.”56 S. Radhakrishnan, a former 
philosopher/president of the Republic of India, also insists that 
tolerant dharma ethic is capable of reminding other religions that 
they also have potential of strengthening tolerance toward the rest 
of the world.57 The dynamic tolerant syncretism arising from Navya 
Nyaya (New Reason) distinguishes the cosmopolitan vision from 
pluralism, whose main tenet is that the “irreconcilable absence of 
consensus” is itself something of social, philosophical, and even 
political value.58 This is in contrast with the traditional moral 
relativist’s argument - if there is no objective right and no objective 
wrong, then might makes right and weakness is wrong. The notion 
of tolerance remains an alternative to the traditional strongman’s 
approach to moral relativism. Sen argues that tolerance allows us to 
discuss, value and judge traditions of the others without making 
criticism based on that understanding in any external sense. 
One cannot deduce ethical rules concerning tolerance, such as 
“Thou shall not kill,” or “Thou shall not tell untruth,” or any other 
unitary law for all people by a systematic step to tolerance and 
relativism, 59 because of the idea whatever we can do, others are 
also likely to do with equal logic.60 A solution to the debate about 
rival values is plausible by sociological explanations as well, but 
not in a convincing way because in any cosmological vein, the 
reapplication theory gives “X is good” = “X is something we think 
is good,” and such a debate procedure continues for ever, 
providing the infinitely regressive steps leading to uncertainty. 
However, Sen observes the difference between positionally 
objective illusions, such as the bent-stick or mirage, and 
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positionally objective non-illusory observations. Even a single daily 
sunset involves an infinite complex series of consciousness in 
observation, and, as such, one is obliged to end the regress by 
accepting the existence of non-consciousness and non-intentional 
experience. An observation that the sun and the moon appear the 
same size is an objective but positioned stance, that is, positionalilty 
depends on the observer’s certain position in space on the surface.61 
This objectivity requires an interpersonally sharable 
understanding, a sharing that objectivity in any form must 
minimally demand. This is not a position-invariant objective truth, 
because the moon and the sun seen from the earth as same size 
does not entail that they are of the same size in terms of all 
conditions of measurement. The objectivity of a particular 
perspective does not really establish its epistemic status beyond a 
certain position.62 Some Nyayayika logicians propose as a solution 
that it is possible to perceive every instance of a universal property 
if one is familiar with the universal itself. This is “generic 
perception” theory, which stands for unity with multiplicity that 
rely on contexts. An indexical expression is a term that is able to 
refer to two different objects in different contexts. Standard 
examples include demonstrative “this,” “that,” “here,” and “now.” 
However, the treatment of indexicality within the realist theory of 
meaning is problematic, because if the meaning of a term is 
identified with its reference, an indexical reference will be 
ambiguous. The philosopher Gadhadhara resolves the issue by 
running through (anugama) the various referents.63 
Perceptive Experience and Observation: The Tolerance 
Debate in Induction and Deduction      
In his essay about “Westernizing illusion,” Sen argues that no fixed 
essence exists, and as such, an impartial discussion may not be 
served by mere comparison.  In cultural relativism, anti-relativists 
expect us to worry about provincialism that endanger our 
perception, which temporarily loses its ethical consciousness. On 
this premise, our attempts to interpret concepts such as karma, 
dharma, and morals will necessarily be frustrated since the meaning 
of such terms is generated within the linguistic and philosophical 
framework of cultures which are wholly different from someone’s 
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own view.  Marx brings economy as the central theme in a dialectic 
process, but our interpretation becomes nearly impossible as 
induction/deduction processes are invoked to establish 
determination of perception. Taken at its extreme, this form of 
relativism about the merit of the two means to perception seems to 
imply that one can be better than the other. Given the requirement 
of total evidence in perception, disputes between different theories 
of evidence and reasoning are not merely verbal; they involve 
disagreements as to which inductive conclusions are required. The 
relativism debate is about under-determinacy of our perception of 
a particular culture. Conventional wisdom posits that the West uses 
deduction to obtain imperfectly received knowledge whereas 
Indian logic mostly uses induction to reach “sound” conclusions. 
The reliance on the notion of two separate systems in logic as a 
main anchor of culture in tolerance obstructs the promotion of 
respect for diversity and social justice, an approach that recognizes 
the conflicting perspectives with tolerant culture.Kisor Chakrabarti 
argues that the drive to get at a priori essence of natural 
phenomena, and proceeded by the demonstration of effects from 
the first cause, is alien to the Nyaya thought. There is an agreement, 
K. Chakrabarti insists, between the Nyaya and Hume on the 
foundational role of causation for inferences concerning matter of 
fact,64 which refutes the assertion that Eastern logic has a superior 
claim. Merits and demerits of two logics are themselves relative for 
several reasons.     
First, Indian logic arises out of two traditions - the tradition of 
debate/dialectics, and the epistemological/empirical traditions,65 
as such, it relies on the problem of validity of inference, anumana 
pramana, and its mode of justification, and for that purposes, logic 
has to  focus mainly on the relation of pervasion, or vyapti-kendrita 
sastra, which has a wide scope of meaning. This relation is required 
also for characterization of Western logical tradition’s central in 
valid deductive inference, of course, with some difference. Unlike 
Western system of proof, Indian pramana, truth, is both the 
originating conditions of true cognition and the normative 
principle of its validation.66 
Second, the Nyaya’s five-step process in terms of syllogism is 
similar to the Western deductive-entomological model of 
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explanation.  Nyaya’s two-fold notions in perception are (a) it is 
sensory knowledge as when we see a table which is before us, and 
(b) an inner perception, as when we realize that we are happy.67 
The means to perceptive knowledge, inference and verbal 
testimony, points directly to a fact and not in the sense reporting 
that it is a means to valid knowledge. Thus, perception, being Sen’s 
investigating tool, points to a jar immediately through perceptual 
knowledge. Some things such as one’s own self, pain, pleasure, 
time and space are thus directly known whereas all else through 
one or other remaining senses. This deductive process may be less 
central to our beliefs and life, but is essential in our daily logical 
system. If we believe that shining gold is more expensive than less 
glamorous silver, and silver is more expensive than tin, deduction 
enables us to make the implication of our existing knowledge by 
revealing that we also believe gold to be more expensive than tin. 
Deduction enables us to make the implications of our existing 
beliefs more explicit, searching for counterexamples and to know 
whether our views are logically coherent.68 At best it can be 
observed that compared to the Greek model of deductive 
systematization, the Indian system has the merit of not being 
committed to the doctrine of self-evident first principle. For Matilal, 
it means an identification of inference vis-a-vis sophisticated 
arguments and similar topics.69 In general inference, we accept a 
valid instrument of knowledge, although inferences are wrong and 
thus any general claim about validity of inferential reasoning 
should respond to this issue.70 Investigations show that every 
mystical element in Indian logical thought can be found in Greek 
thought too.71 
Third, for the philosopher Raghunathia, perception is more than 
the defense of the seven categories of metaphysics, because it is 
about what it means to assert or deny legitimacy by induction or 
deduction.72 Thus, Matilal argues that there is hardly any distinct 
difference between induction and deduction in Indian logic, and, as 
such, this lack of distinction adds to the charge that Indian logic is 
not really logic, while both relativists and anti-relativists invoke the 
argument that induction and deduction in logic are required to 
draw a valid distinction. Karl Popper, in his essay, “The Problem of 
Induction,” outlines several reasons why inductive reasoning 
cannot be a valid “proof” of scientific theory or knowledge. In 
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order to avoid a fallacy like begging the question as in the regress 
justification arguing inductively, one may introduce a new 
inductive principle. This principle will necessitate a justification 
from experience, leading to more inductive reasoning.  So, Popper 
rejects Kant’s contention that induction is a priori synthetic truth, 
but agrees with Hume that inductive system might argue that, 
while we cannot prove something to be true inductively, we might 
also be able to show that it is probable. However like Hume, 
Popper also argues that this also leads to a circular infinite regress, 
as Popper makes two separate points. Empirical psychology and 
history are required in the process of obtaining scientific 
knowledge. There is no pre-set version of a logical discovery. For 
Popper, scientific logic is deductive, and in that sense, scientific 
knowledge itself is merely an infinite regress of inductive 
knowledge. Here, inductive knowledge replaces one theory with a 
newer one that also hinges on inductive logic.73 
Fourth, there are some obvious problems in making separation 
between logical and empirical inquiries to identify sources of 
knowledge.74 In Western logic, deduction and induction are not just 
different in character but also associated with different conceptual 
world-views. Deduction, which is associated with certainty and its 
formal structure, is not only independent of the world-views but 
also with the truth related premises. Its “non-implicative character” 
refers to inference in that no knowledge which is not already 
present in the premises can be observed in conclusion. On the other 
hand, induction is not only characterized by an “implicative 
character,” in which conclusion has more knowledge which is 
available in the premises, but also by an uncertainty of its 
conclusions. A logical division by way of making a divisive case 
between Western deduction and Indian induction gives an 
erroneous assumption that one line of reasoning is absolutely 
different from the other, and as such, one is relatively better. No 
doubt, the deductive mode of knowledge organization is correctly 
prized in the West, especially in exact sciences because of its 
precision and economy, but being the means to systematization of 
grammatical knowledge, it remains inherently universal in the 
scope of application. The deductive model of knowledge has 
extensively been used by the great grammarian Panini, who 
deductively calls for an organized model, calling for the absence of 
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under-extension, avyapti, which is the condition for correctness, and 
also for the absence of over-extension.   This is a process of 
elimination in over-extension and under-extension.75 
Last, deductive logic is extensively used by Patanjali to find social 
meaning in grammar.  Katyana’s deductive methodology suggests 
that the body of truths under investigation constitutes the laksya - a 
deductive system. Matilal argues that the hearer’s language-
processing mechanism generates an output belief from any given 
input sentence. The meaning has two stages. One is literal (sanketa), 
and the other is an indication, and thus derived, laksyana. This 
meaning-relation is called the “word-meaning,” which is also 
derived. This deduction process is called by Chomsky as 
“language.”76 Thus, Navya-Nyaya argumentation developed by 
Udayana (c. 1050 A.D), Gangesa (a. 1200 A.D), and Raghunatha (c. 
1500 A.D.), posits that in any logical argument, induction and 
deduction may not necessarily be separate. In Nyaya’s syllogism, 
there are two elements, induction and deduction, together to reach 
the knowledge stage. For instance, “All men are mortal” and 
“Rama is a man,” and “therefore Rama is mortal.” Deductive 
reasoning needs the universal proposition: “All men are mortal,” 
which is an inductive generalization. For dialectics, induction, 
which is broadly used in Indian argumentation, is not the stripping 
of the individuals down to an abstract, a common feature, but 
rather the discovery of the principle of the “whole” that unites all 
the individual parts in a single process.77 Thus, Sen accords well 
with Bernard Williams, who argues that the contrast between two 
sets of logic seems to be redundant, because consciousness cannot 
just switch off our logical argumentation when we are confronted 
with another group, and there is no reason why it should.78 
Theory of Justification and Infinite Regress  
In the West, propositions about tolerance are accepted as real 
entities, as something outside language, whereas in India, cognition 
predicts truth, a real process related to the knower, and yet this 
cognition is not entirely subjective because there is a logical 
structure, which can be obtained through reflection on cognition. It 
is this structure which makes truth objective, but again, a new 
problem arises as to the means of ascertaining “embedded” morals, 
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which stand at Sen’s core thesis in posing the futility of cultural 
relativism. Thus, identification and observation of ethical norms are 
at the core of the cultural relativism debate. Can relativists morally 
engage in attempts to redress injustice in their own societies, or 
anywhere? We have so far argued that cultural and social 
agreements about social ethics in tolerant attitudes have benefits 
and disadvantages.  John Hawthorne (2004), Timothy Williamson 
(2005) and Patrick Rysiew (2012) argue that the unstable picture of 
knowledge undermines the trans-contextual role, in which 
knowledge means retrieving and transmitting relevant facts. 
Richard Feinberg (2007) argues that moral relativism may not be a 
conclusion about reality, but is a tool for data collection as well as 
interpretation. Seema Gupta (2010) argues that deontological 
theories of ethics maintain that individual motives are to be judged 
not directly by their results, but by their conformity to moral rules, 
a position earnestly upheld by Amartya Sen, who exposes the 
analysts’ contradictions associated with the idea – “infinite 
regress,” which is hotly debated in both organized religious studies 
and physical sciences. Sen concludes that infinite regress or eternal 
regress refers to the sizes of objects, having a beginning of 
construction, but not the end. One is an adverb, whereas the other 
is an adjective, and thus, one cannot go backward eternally. It is 
impractical, he adds, to claim that our regressing motion is infinite. 
At best, it can be the size of an object. If our current issue is finding 
the location of ethical elements contributing to an impartial 
resolution, then our focus is on two rival sets of ethics.  Sen resolves 
the regress problem by concluding that three dimensions “self, 
others, and the world” belong together as they reciprocally 
illuminate one another, and thus, can be fully understood only in 
their interconnection in which relativism in its negative 
imagination does not fit into the formulation of the concept of 
tolerance. The Naiyayakia debaters logically argue that a cultural 
interpretation can avoid a vicious infinite regress, but there is a 
layered-ness between a property (lotus) and the qualifying 
relation.79 When repeated challenges to an agent’s perception  
eventually drives us to identify the contingencies in existence, we 
view these as potential barriers to full autonomy, rather than 
barriers to the conceptual possibility of an account of autonomy. 
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Thus, it is unnecessary to complete an infinite regress before 
reaching an autonomy-limited perspective.80 
Because the regress theory is about the core-periphery distinction 
(existence and non-existence) in a conceptual typology, the 
philosopher Dharmakiriti provides the “infinite regress formula,” 
which has progressive conscious and the logical step; the reflective 
self-awareness cannot be the effective in internal monitoring, which 
is a second-order reflection only. Since it is a separate act of 
perception that takes the original state as its object so it goes on 
continuously. Thus, on pain of infinite regress, reflexive self-
awareness must be a first-order element of a conscious state. In 
order for the second-order mental state to be conscious, it would 
have to be taken as an object by numerically distinct third-order 
mental state, and so on ad infinitum.81 The American philosopher 
Shoemaker adds that the first-order self-consciousness has inherent 
self-reference without further identification, and so, there is no 
need of a second-order or meta-act of reflection or perception. This 
form of self-consciousness is the non-dyadic mode of awareness.82 
In simple terms, the easy way to halt the regress is by accepting 
existence of non-conscious mental states. Defenders of a high order 
theory at the same time face challenges from the second-order 
thought or perception.  
In the regress theory, there is another question: Is there any 
sentence that is true/false in any finite ethical moral model, 
regardless of its size, but not in any infinite atomic intended 
model? Obviously, there is none, and therefore, we cannot say that 
there are finitely or infinitely many atoms unless we say that there 
are something more specific about the number of atoms. “We can 
define relations that behave in many ways like the membership 
relation of the set theory,83  which is about parts of classes.  For any 
set, we have its power class by an unrestricted composition, and 
given a hypothesis that a certain “P” is a small class, and yet it is a 
“set.” Given this status, something infinite is small, and smallness 
of number serves more than just aesthetic purposes, and thus, Jerry 
Fodor argues that there are fewer parameters than there are 
possible rules in a rule-based framework; otherwise, it would be 
less obvious that the amount of learning to be done is reduced in a 
parametric framework.84 The arguments based on “infinite regress” 
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are sweeping and powerful as spelled out in a set theory, but on the 
Madhyamika side, the rejection of relational existence is the issue. A 
clarity is provided by Nagarjuna, who argues that pairs unstable, 
so, the self-referential condition is not logical.85 Because the regress 
problem is driven by an assumption, the ab initio requirement can 
be rejected.86 In Sen’s interpretation, self-creating self-consciousness 
with virtual autonomy does never exist.  In Western logic also we 
are required to accept that the self is not self-creating, and complete 
self-creation is impossible. The complete self-creation requires two 
contradictory propositions – that the self-creating thing exists, 
which seems to be necessary for it to do anything, and then the 
thing does not exist, which must be true in order for it to require to 
be created. Thus, we have good reasons to reject the antecedent, 
that is, the ab initio requirement. Parameters of an observation have 
not only been assumed to be descriptively simple, but it has been 
taken for granted that they are manageably small in number as 
well.87 
 Conclusion 
The unity question between two positions, my tolerance versus 
your tolerance, a value-related issue, has raised the logical 
controversy over the nature and function of the Brahman, which is 
apparently the ultimate reality, thereby raising the specific 
discussion of the relation between the Brahman and finite 
individuals. J. N. Mohanty conforms to the observation of 
Ramanuja, Shankar and Vallavaha, who argue that differences are 
mere appearances. This presupposition is to the finality.88 Advaita 
argues that our precepts are apparently material objects, but in 
reality they are empty (sunya), because they have no self-nature 
(svabhava). They are only the phenomenal expression, according to 
Advaitva, of qualities (niguna) of mind. This in turn raises the 
debatable issue of contact, which is understood to mean the 
conjunction of two substances that were previously not in 
conjunction.  Conjunctions are relational qualities belonging to two 
particulars, as opposed to non-relational qualities like colors and 
shapes, which qualify single particulars.  Thus, pramans or proofs 
have the dual role, both as the means toward knowledge and as a 
cause of cognition, and so, J.N. Mohanty explicitly argues that in 
Tattva- Journal of Philosophy                                                       ISSN 0975-332X 
76 
 
the revival of causal theories of knowledge in Western philosophy, 
perhaps pramana theory that deals with realism could be useful. 
Interestingly, the unique feature of the mature Samkhya 
philosophical system is that it rigidly separates the real of purusha 
from the material world. The idea is that spirit merely looks on as a 
witness consciousness, illuminating without inferring in the 
differentiated real at all. At the same time, prakriti is regarded as the 
source from which has emanated the entire material world, 
including even the discriminating intellect, our ego and mind, 
thereby giving this part of the Samkhya system a materialist as well 
as reductionist slant in reasoning.89 This knowledge gathering is 
about the parameterization means. However, Amartya Sen views 
this process not only as an enabling “capability” achieved 
“functioning” but also as an achieved functioning. With a direct 
and explicit reference to the meaning of human capabilities, some 
factors related to personal feature, including habit of telling 
conformity and co-operative dealings in social life, emphasizing 
tolerance in life, also are highlighted for practical reason. These are 
his indicators for “achieved functioning.”90 
In making an observation seeking validity of Indian traditional 
tolerance, Amartya Sen takes the minimalist program similar to a 
theory of clausal typing, whereby an idea of morality or a 
perception or a philosophy, must choose one of these two methods 
of typing. Whether Sen actually succeeds in avoiding an infinite 
regress is not the entire discussion about tolerance and relativism. 
Brentano and others argue that avoiding one type of regress gives 
rise to another. One can still view self-awareness as a special form 
of object-consciousness.  Here, Sen’s task consists of analyzing the 
precise structure of tolerant empathy and spelling out the 
differences between empathy and other forms of intentionality, 
such as perception, imagination, and historical recollection. This is 
our precise argument in projecting Sen’s   means of identifying the 
elements of impartiality in Indian variety of tolerance as part of his 
broader concept of perception. We never see any estimate of the 
number of binary-valued (as in relativism) parameters required to 
capture all possibilities of core language that exceeded a few dozen. 
In this case, the Buddhist logic faces a difficulty in the apparent 
inter-subjectivity of diverse objects because our individual 
moments of perceiving can be contradictory; sensation is concept-
Santosh C. Saha                                    Tolerant Values and Practices in India 
77 
 
free but conceptualization is imaginative, a condition giving rise to 
a problem in the justification of regress, a generative perspective on 
philosophical typology.91 
In hard cultural relativism, one norm is just as good or bad as the 
other. Husserl argues that there is a difference between the 
perception of a tone and the original or inner consciousness in 
which perception is simply objects in inner consciousness in which 
further objects are constituted as a temporal unit only. Thus, the 
route to correct perception of paired terms is either intrinsically 
known, or it requires further action for  confirmation, which leads 
to infinite regress because every confirmatory cognition would 
need another confirmatory cognition and so on.  In other words, an 
act of reasoning backward from an effect to a cause implies 
transcending, or outdoing limits so as to connect with something 
valuable. It is a connection with an external value, but this value 
may not involve any connection with an infinite value. We may 
aspire to that value, but to fall short is not to be deprived of 
meaning because “there are many numbers between zero and 
infinity.”92 In a different mode, Matilal invokes the theory of 
“inference-stoppers,” insisting that “those defects in the input 
would be inference-stoppers,” and not “generators of wrong 
inferences.” Nyaya clearly states that there cannot be any 
generalized “misinference” if inference “is to follow the derivation 
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